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Abstract 5 
Given the recent debate on central banks’ role under climate change, this research 6 
theoretically investigates the mix of monetary and climate policy and provides some 7 
insights for central banks who are considering their engagement in the climate change 8 
issue. The “climate-augmented” monetary policy is pioneeringly proposed and studied. 9 
We build an extended Environmental Dynamic Stochastic General Equilibrium (E-10 
DSGE) model as the method. By this model, we find the following results. First, the 11 
making process of monetary policy should consider the existing climate policy and 12 
environmental regulation. Second, the coefficients in traditional monetary policy can 13 
be better set to enhance welfare when climate policy is given. This provides a way to 14 
optimise the policy mix. Third, if a typical form climate target is augmented into the 15 
monetary policy rule, a dilemma could be created. This means that it has some risks for 16 
central banks to care for the climate proactively by using the narrow monetary policy. 17 
At the current stage, central banks could and should use other measures to help the 18 
climate and the financial stability. 19 
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1. Introduction 21 
Should central banks engage in the climate change issue? In 2015, a report 22 
published by the Bank of England5 proposed that climate change could pose a risk to 23 
financial stability and economic development. Since then, and especially after the 24 
signing of the Paris Agreement, climate change and the broader environmental issue 25 
have become a factor that central banks are called on to consider. By forming the 26 
Network of Central Banks and Supervisors for Greening the Financial System (NGFS) 27 
in 2017 and the International Platform on Sustainable Finance (IPSF) in 2019, many 28 
central banks are starting to investigate ways to manage risks from climate change and 29 
to support a green economic transition. For instance, China’s central bank pioneered 30 
the field by supporting “green finance” via monetary policy in 20186 . This can be 31 
viewed as a kind of “climate-augmented” monetary policy, or “green monetary policy”. 32 
However, these arguments and actions do not mean that it is totally justifiable for central 33 
banks to engage in the climate change issue without condition. Some experts worry that 34 
such engagement could deviate central banks’ market neutrality and overburden their 35 
policy tools (violate the Tinbergen Rule). The momentum in policy practice and the 36 
debate on the feasibility of the engagement naturally raise the need of research on the 37 
monetary policy under climate change considerations. 38 
In academia, the exacerbated climate change and environmental challenge has 39 
brought new waves of research in the “environmental macroeconomics” (Hassler et al., 40 
2016). Since 2010, some theoretical frameworks have been founded and applied to 41 
assess how environmental risks and relevant policies could affect the macro-economy. 42 
 
5 Bank of England’s Prudential Regulation Authority (2015). The impact of climate change on the 
UK insurance sector. https://www.bankofengland.co.uk/prudential-regulation/publication/2015/the-
impact-of-climate-change-on-the-uk-insurance-sector  
6 Source: The People’s Bank of China 
http://www.pbc.gov.cn/goutongjiaoliu/113456/113469/3549913/index.html  
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The “Environmental Dynamic Stochastic General Equilibrium (E-DSGE)” model has 43 
been newly developed as a mainstream method. Angelopoulos (2010), Fischer and 44 
Springborn (2011), Heutel (2012), Golosov et al. (2014), Doda (2014), Annicchiarico 45 
and DiDio (2015), and Dissou and Karnizova (2016) investigated relationships between 46 
greenhouse gas (GHG)/pollutant emissions and business cycles by setting 47 
GHG/pollutant as an externality in the economy and determined how environmental 48 
policies influence either fluctuation or economic growth. Other researchers have 49 
studied the effect of weather on economic volatility. Chen (2014) built a model with 50 
weather shocks embedded and found that it had good explanatory power for China’s 51 
business cycle. Gallic and Vermandel (2019) found that weather shocks account for a 52 
very significant proportion of economic volatility in the long run. Of those policy-53 
related studies, two regimes of environmental policy, namely cap-and-trade (permitting) 54 
and taxing, are the main subjects of focus. For example, Golosov et al. (2014) tried to 55 
find the optimal level of taxing fossil fuels. Dissou and Karnizova (2016) compared the 56 
different implications of reducing CO2 emissions with carbon permits and carbon taxes 57 
in place.  58 
At first glance, monetary policy and environmental issues are seemingly unrelated. 59 
However, such traditional notion starts changing. According to the above research, 60 
environment factors and policies are proven to influence either the fluctuation or the 61 
growth of the economy, which is exactly what monetary policy cares about. Hence, 62 
some researchers have started to investigate the role of central banks and monetary 63 
policy under climate change. Pioneering discussions, including Haavio (2010), 64 
Campiglio (2016), Ma (2017), McKibbin et al. (2017), and Bolton et al. (2020), have 65 
qualitatively explained the linking mechanism between monetary policy and climate 66 
change. Particularly, Krogstrup and Oman (2019) point out that the mix of 67 
macroeconomic and financial policies for climate change mitigation needs further 68 
investigation. 69 
Quantitatively, Annicchiarico and DiDio (2017) were the first to use an E-DSGE 70 
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model to study the mix of monetary and climate policy. They compared three specific 71 
mixes and showed that the optimal monetary policies should be tightened slightly when 72 
GHG emissions are considered. Economides and Xepapadeas (2018) compared 73 
monetary policy both with and without considering climate change in the model and 74 
found that the reaction of monetary policy to economic shocks will be affected by 75 
climate change. Punzi (2019) introduced borrowing constraints and heterogeneous 76 
production sectors into the model to investigate green financing activity and found that 77 
only the differentiated capital requirement policy can sustain green financing. Huang 78 
and Punzi (2019) incorporated financial friction, according to Bernanke et al. (1999), 79 
and found that environmental regulations can accelerate the risks that the financial 80 
system faces. Chan (2020) introduced environmental targeting carbon taxation, fiscal, 81 
and monetary policies and compared their different effects in terms of improving the 82 
environment and welfare. 83 
These scholars can be regarded to have started a new discussion on monetary policy 84 
and the environment. However, because of the growing global enthusiasm on 85 
sustainability, central banks are expected to respond to more concerns about this issue. 86 
It includes the macroeconomic and financial stability implications of climate change, 87 
the risks of stranded assets, the relationship between monetary policy and both climate 88 
change and climate policy, how to encourage green finance, the cost and benefit of 89 
“green monetary policy”, and many other aspects.7 Many specific concerns have not 90 
been touched upon by previous works. 91 
In this research, we aim to investigate the relationship between and the mix of 92 
monetary and climate policy and provide some insights for central banks who are 93 
 
7 Please refer to the NGFS’s “Technical Supplement” to the “First Comprehensive Report” 
(https://www.banque-france.fr/sites/default/files/media/2019/08/19/ngfs-report-technical-supplement_fi
nal_v2.pdf), “The Macroeconomic and Financial Stability Impacts of Climate Change Research 
Priorities” (https://www.ngfs.net/sites/default/files/medias/documents/ngfs_research_priorities_final.p
df) and NGFS’s research priorities listed by The International Network for Sustainable Financia
l Policy Insights, Research, and Exchange (INSPIRE) (https://www.climateworks.org/inspire/) 
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considering their engagement in the climate change issue. We will answer three new 94 
and relevant questions: (1) Whether and how monetary policy is influenced by climate 95 
policy? (2) Whether and how monetary policy can be improved when the climate policy 96 
is considered in the framework of analysis and whether there is an optimal monetary 97 
policy? and (3) Should a central bank adopt a “climate-augmented” monetary policy or 98 
use monetary policy to care for the climate proactively? By answering these questions, 99 
we can understand how monetary policy can coordinate with climate policy and some 100 
mechanisms of the policy mixing. The above research topic and questions mainly 101 
extend that of Annicchiarico and DiDio (2017). We also extend it by working on more 102 
research objects: more kinds of policy mixes that are closer to the real-world policy, not 103 
only the mixes that contain Ramsey optimised policy. 104 
Our method for research is an extended E-DSGE model. The basic DSGE setting 105 
is in line with the standard New Keynesian framework. The basic “Environmental” 106 
features are introduced following Annicchiarico and DiDio (2017) by incorporating the 107 
GHG emissions from production, their negative externality on productivity, and the 108 
climate policy that controls emissions, i.e., cap-and-trade or carbon tax. To consider the 109 
environmental module in a more comprehensive way, we also introduce some novel 110 
environmental features into the model: the concealed emissions, the potential penalty 111 
for them, and the effectiveness of enforcement of such penalty. These concealed 112 
emission-related features are omitted by traditional E-DSGE models, but actually 113 
common in the reality and found to be nontrivial in the model economy. 114 
Based on the E-DSGE model, we first mix monetary policy [of Taylor rule type 115 
(Taylor, 1993), which is a close approximation of the real-world] with different types 116 
of climate policy and compare these different mixes to see if climate policy can 117 
influence monetary policy. The impulse responses of major economic and 118 
environmental variables to shocks and the conditional welfare and consumption 119 
equivalents are calculated. The results show that when monetary policy is mixed with 120 
different types of climate policy under different effectiveness of environmental 121 
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regulation, its dynamic changes. Therefore, the making process of monetary policy 122 
should consider the existing climate policy and environmental regulation. 123 
We then explore a traditional way to improve the mix of monetary and climate 124 
policy. This is to optimise the coefficients in the Taylor rule of monetary policy. The 125 
results show that the coefficients can always be better set to enhance welfare when a 126 
certain regime of climate policy is considered in the framework. If the cost-push shock 127 
is dominant in the economy, optimal coefficients exist. Both the climate policy regime 128 
and the effectiveness of environmental regulation can affect the value of the optimal 129 
coefficients. 130 
Finally, we propose to improve the policy mix by introducing a radically “climate-131 
augmented” monetary policy, which can help determine whether it is good for a central 132 
bank to use monetary policy to care for the climate proactively. This is to introduce an 133 
emission gap target into the Taylor rule of monetary policy. The results show that the 134 
welfare of the economy can be enhanced when monetary policy is augmented by the 135 
new target and the coefficient of the target is set in a specific interval. However, under 136 
some circumstances, such monetary policy will create a dilemma for central banks. This 137 
indicates a risk if we directly use the narrow monetary policy to care for the climate. 138 
The novelty of this research lies in three aspects. First, the research topic. Besides 139 
being among the first within the emerging discussion and modelling work on monetary 140 
policy in the context of climate change, this research investigates three important 141 
questions (see above) that are newly emerging in policy making and pioneeringly 142 
studies the “’climate-augmented’ monetary policy” in a formal model. This help answer 143 
questions raised by the NGFS. Second, the research scope. Extending Annicchiarico 144 
and DiDio (2017) who considered either monetary or climate policy as Ramsey type in 145 
the policy mix, we work on mixes with both the two policies non-Ramsey optimised, 146 
which can better represent the real-world. Third, the research method. The traditional 147 
E-DSGE model is firstly enriched with concealed emission-related features so that its 148 
environmental module is more comprehensive and closer to the reality. 149 
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The paper proceeds as follow. Section 2 describes the extended E-DSGE model. 150 
Section 3 compares the mixes of monetary policy with different climate policies. 151 
Section 4 investigates the optimisation of policy mixes. Sections 5 concludes. 152 
2. Model 153 
We construct an extended E-DSGE model based on the New Keynesian 154 
framework. GHG emissions from production, their negative externality on productivity, 155 
and environmental policies that control emissions are introduced following 156 
Annicchiarico and DiDio (2017). Innovatively, concealed (illegal) emissions, the 157 
potential penalty for them, and the effectiveness of enforcement of such penalty are set 158 
into the model by extending the enterprise sector and environmental authority. This is 159 
to depict the reality that in many countries the environmental regulation is not very 160 
strict, and firms have some space to emit more than the legal level. 161 
The introduction of concealed emission-related features enriches the traditional E-162 
DSGE models, making it more comprehensive and closer to the reality. Such 163 
introduction is also found to be nontrivial for answering our research questions. The 164 
potential penalty for concealed emissions can be regarded as another dimension of 165 
environmental regulation, in addition to the traditional climate policy (carbon tax or 166 
cap-and-trade). 167 
2.1 Household 168 
A representative household maximises its expected lifetime utility, which is 169 
determined by consumption 𝐶𝑡 and labour 𝐿𝑡 and has the form of 170 
𝔼0 { 
 ∑𝛽𝑡𝑆𝑡 (ln 𝐶𝑡 − 𝜇𝐿 𝐿𝑡1+𝜂1 + 𝜂)∞𝑡=0 } 
 (1) 171 
where 0 < 𝛽 < 1 is the discount factor, 𝜂 ≥ 0 is the inverse of the elasticity of 172 
labour supply, and 𝜇𝐿 > 0 is the coefficient of disutility of labour. 𝑆𝑡 represents the 173 
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stochastic shocks of time-preference, which follows ln 𝑆𝑡 = 𝜌𝑆 ln 𝑆𝑡−1 + (1 −174 𝜌𝑆) ln 𝑆 + 𝑒𝑆,𝑡 to evolve, where 0 < 𝜌𝑆 < 1 and 𝑒𝑆,𝑡~𝑖. 𝑖. 𝑑. 𝑁(0, 𝜎𝑆2). 175 
The budget constraint of the household is 176 𝑃𝑡𝐶𝑡 + 𝑅𝑡−1𝐵𝑡+1 = 𝐵𝑡 +𝑊𝑡𝐿𝑡 + 𝐷𝑡 + 𝑃𝑡𝑇𝑡 (2) 177 
where 𝑃𝑡 is the price of final good, 𝐵𝑡 and 𝐵𝑡+1 are the nominal quantity of riskless 178 
bonds at period 𝑡 and 𝑡 + 1 , 𝑅𝑡 is the riskless interest rate of the bonds which is 179 
determined by the central bank, 𝑊𝑡 is the nominal wage of labour, 𝐷𝑡 denotes the 180 
nominal dividend derived from enterprises, and 𝑇𝑡 is the lump-sum transfer from 181 
government. 182 
At the optimum we have the following first-order conditions 183 𝛽𝑅𝑡𝔼t [𝑆𝑡+1𝑆𝑡 𝐶𝑡𝐶𝑡+1 1Πt+1 ] = 1 (3) 184 𝐿𝑡𝜂 = 𝑊𝑡𝜇𝐿𝑃𝑡𝐶𝑡 (4) 185 
where Πt+1 = 𝑃𝑡+1/𝑃𝑡  is the inflation of period t + 1 . Equation (1) is the Euler 186 
equation, and equation (2) is the labour supply equation. 187 
2.2 Enterprise and the Environment 188 
Consistent with the standard New Keynesian framework, the enterprise sector is 189 
formed by final good and intermediate good producers. The final good 𝑌𝑡 is produced 190 
by competitive firms using the Constant Elasticity of Substitution (CES) technology 191 
𝑌𝑡 = [∫ 𝑌𝑗,𝑡 𝜃𝑡−1 𝜃𝑡 𝑑𝑗10 ]  𝜃𝑡 𝜃𝑡−1 (5) 192 
where 𝑌𝑗,𝑡 denotes the intermediate goods produced by monopolistically competitive 193 
firms, and the subscript 𝑗 ∈ [0,1] denotes the intermediate good firms of a continuum. 194 𝜃𝑡 > 1 is the elasticity of substitution and is also a stochastic process that describes the 195 
cost-push shock (Smets and Wouters (2003)). It follows ln  𝜃𝑡 = 𝜌𝜃 ln  𝜃𝑡−1 +196 (1 − 𝜌𝜃) ln 𝜃 + 𝑒𝜃,𝑡 with 0 < 𝜌𝜃 < 1 and  𝑒𝜃,𝑡~𝑖. 𝑖. 𝑑. 𝑁(0, 𝜎𝜃2). 197 
Final good producers maximise their profit, which is determined by 198 
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𝑃𝑡𝑌𝑡 −∫ 𝑌𝑗,𝑡 𝜃𝑡−1 𝜃𝑡 𝑑𝑗10 (6) 199 
The first-order condition yields the demand function for intermediate goods 200 𝑌𝑗,𝑡 = (𝑃𝑗,𝑡𝑃𝑡 )− 𝜃𝑡 𝑌𝑡 (7) 201 
and 202 𝑃𝑡 = [∫ 𝑃𝑗,𝑡1− 𝜃𝑡𝑑𝑗10 ] 11− 𝜃𝑡 (8) 203 
which implies that the price of final good 𝑃𝑡 is also the price level. 204 
A typical intermediate good firm has a production function 205 𝑌𝑗,𝑡 = 𝛬𝑡𝐴𝑡𝐿𝑗,𝑡 (9) 206 
where 𝐴𝑡 is the total factor productivity (TFP) factor or technology that follows a 207 
stochastic process ln 𝐴𝑡 = 𝜌𝐴 ln 𝐴𝑡−1 + (1 − 𝜌𝐴) ln 𝐴 + 𝑒𝐴,𝑡 , in which 0 < 𝜌𝐴 < 1 208 
and 𝑒𝐴,𝑡~𝑖. 𝑖. 𝑑. 𝑁(0, 𝜎𝐴2). Following Golosov et al. (2014), 𝛬𝑡 is a damage coefficient 209 
that describes the negative externality of GHG emissions on productivity (TFP damage 210 
coefficient). It is the pivot linking the economy and the environment. 𝛬𝑡 is determined 211 
by the stock of emissions following 212 𝛬𝑡 = e−𝜒(𝑀𝑡−?̃?) (10) 213 
where 𝑀𝑡 is the stock of emissions of period t, ?̃? is the level before the industrial 214 
revolution, and 𝜒>0 measures the intensity of negative externality. 215 
 According to Heutel (2012), GHG emissions are a by-product of the production 216 
process. The original emissions from production are 𝑍𝑗,𝑡𝑜𝑟𝑖  which is proportional 217 
(measured by 𝜑) to the volume of output of intermediate firms 218 𝑍𝑗,𝑡𝑜𝑟𝑖 = 𝜑𝑌𝑗,𝑡 (11) 219 
To dispose of the original emissions, a firm has three channels to use and trade-off: 220 
abate emission, emit legally and pay tax, and conceal emission. A firm can choose to 221 
abate a percentage of 𝑈𝑡,𝑗 (0 ≤ 𝑈𝑡,𝑗 ≤ 1) of the original emissions which will bring a 222 
marginal increasing cost of 𝜙1𝑈𝑗,𝑡𝜙2𝑌𝑗,𝑡, where 𝜙1 = 𝜙1′𝜑 > 0 and 𝜙2 > 1 are cost 223 
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coefficients. A firm can also choose to legally emit some original emissions. This 224 
requires a firm to pay a carbon tax or buy an emission permit in the cap-and-trade 225 
system (depending on the climate policy regime) at a price 𝑝𝑍,𝑡 for every unit of GHG 226 
emissions.  227 
The novelty of our model is the introduction of concealed emitting channel and 228 
related environmental regulation. Normally, a government or environmental 229 
authority cannot detect every source of pollution. So, firms have some space to emit 230 
secretly and provide artificially low legal emission data, making their real emission 231 
higher than the legal level which they have either paid tax or bought a permit. The secret 232 
or concealed emissions will save some costs for either emission abating or legal 233 
emitting. Meanwhile, the concealed emissions are subject to potential fine. Although a 234 
government may not be able to spot every concealed emission, they usually have some 235 
degree of regulation on such emissions and will pose some costs (most commonly 236 
penalty or prosecution) to the emitters spotted. A recent example of the concealed 237 
emission and the related regulation is the Volkswagen emissions scandal in 2015. The 238 
Volkswagen company concealed their cars’ excessive emissions by technical 239 
manipulation for years. It was detected by chance and then the company has faced a 240 
huge amount of fine by governments. 241 
To abstract the above, we assume that firms (as a whole) have the concealed 242 
emitting channel to dispose of the original emissions; the government spots the 243 
concealed emissions with a certain probability (the lower, the weaker the effectiveness 244 
of environmental regulation on emissions). If spotted, the government penalises the 245 
firm with a certain amount of fine (the fewer, the weaker the effectiveness). To model 246 
this, we assume that a firm faces an expected fine volume that equals to 𝜓2 𝑉𝑡,𝑗2 𝜑𝑌𝑗,𝑡, 247 
where 𝜑𝑌𝑗,𝑡 = 𝑍𝑗,𝑡𝑜𝑟𝑖  is the original emissions; 0 ≤ 𝑉𝑡,𝑗 ≤ 1  is the proportion of 248 
concealed emissions in the original emissions; 𝜓 > 0 is defined as the “Effectiveness 249 
of Enforcement of Environmental Regulation” (EOEER), which is proportional to the 250 
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probability of the government spotting concealed emissions and the amount of the fine 251 
for every unit of concealed emissions. Using the 𝜓2 𝑉𝑡,𝑗2 𝜑𝑌𝑗,𝑡 term as the volume of the 252 
fine is derived from a simple intuition: the more concealed emissions that are emitted 253 
and spotted or the more effective the enforcement of environmental regulation, then the 254 
greater the fine. 𝑉𝑡,𝑗 is quadratic in the term to describe that the total amount of fine is 255 
marginally increasing with regard to 𝑉𝑡,𝑗 — the more that a firm emits concealedly, 256 
the easier are the emissions to be spotted. A number 12 is put into the term to simplify 257 
calculation. 258 
The introduction of concealed emissions and EOEER relaxes the hidden 259 
assumption of the perfect effectiveness of environmental regulation in most previous 260 
E-DSGE models and makes the environmental regulation in our study more 261 
comprehensive and closer to the reality. Such introduction is nontrivial for answering 262 
our specific research questions, as we will show that the differences in EOEER will 263 
make the regimes of climate policy either more similar or more different and further 264 
influence the dynamics of financial and economic variables (see Subsection 3.3). The 265 
potential penalty for concealed emissions can be regarded as another dimension of 266 
environmental regulation, in addition to the traditional climate policy (carbon tax or 267 
cap-and-trade). 268 
The three channels by which firms can dispose of their original emissions, namely 269 
emission abating, legally emitting, and concealedly emitting, have now all been 270 
explained. This is helpful for illuminating the following variables. The real emission 271 𝑍𝑗,𝑡𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑙 is the amount of GHG that is really emitted to the atmosphere and can be 272 
monitored by the government. It equates to the original emissions 𝑍𝑗,𝑡𝑜𝑟𝑖 minus the 273 
abated emissions 𝑍𝑗,𝑡𝑎𝑏𝑎𝑡𝑒 = 𝑈𝑡,𝑗𝜑𝑌𝑗,𝑡. The claimed emissions 𝑍𝑗,𝑡𝑐𝑙𝑎𝑖𝑚𝑒𝑑 is the amount 274 
of GHG emissions that a firm reports to the government concealing its concealed 275 
emissions 𝑍𝑗,𝑡𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑑. It is the amount of legal emissions 𝑍𝑗,𝑡𝑙𝑒𝑔𝑎𝑙 and also the amount 276 
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of tax or permit that a firm needs to either pay or buy (𝑝𝑍,𝑡𝑍𝑗,𝑡𝑙𝑒𝑔𝑎𝑙). It equals to the real 277 
emissions minus the concealed emissions. Accordingly, we have 278 𝑍𝑗,𝑡𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑙 = 𝑍𝑗,𝑡𝑜𝑟𝑖 − 𝑍𝑗,𝑡𝑎𝑏𝑎𝑡𝑒 = (1 − 𝑈𝑡,𝑗)𝜑𝑌𝑗,𝑡 = 𝑍𝑗,𝑡𝑙𝑒𝑔𝑎𝑙 + 𝑍𝑗,𝑡𝑖𝑙𝑙𝑒𝑔𝑎𝑙 (12) 279 𝑍𝑗,𝑡𝑐𝑙𝑎𝑖𝑚𝑒𝑑 = 𝑍𝑗,𝑡𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑙 − 𝑍𝑗,𝑡𝑖𝑙𝑙𝑒𝑔𝑎𝑙 = (1 − 𝑈𝑡,𝑗 − 𝑉𝑡,𝑗)𝜑𝑌𝑗,𝑡 = 𝑍𝑗,𝑡𝑙𝑒𝑔𝑎𝑙 (13) 280 
The above relationship is illustrated in Figure 1. 281 
 282 
Figure 1: The relationship among emission variables 283 
 284 
Considering the cost of disposing of emissions via the three channels and the sticky 285 
pricing assumption in the standard New Keynesian framework (Rotemberg, 1982), the 286 
objective of an intermediate firm is to maximise 287 
𝔼0{ 
 ∑Ω0,𝑡 [𝑃𝑗,𝑡𝑃𝑡 𝑌𝑗,𝑡 − 𝑇𝐶𝑗,𝑡 − 𝛾2( 𝑃𝑗,𝑡𝑃𝑗,𝑡−1 − 1)2 𝑌𝑡]∞𝑡=0 } 
 (14) 288 
which is subject to 289 𝑇𝐶𝑗,𝑡 = 𝑊𝑡𝑃𝑡 𝐿𝑗,𝑡 + 𝜙1𝑈𝑗,𝑡𝜙2𝑌𝑗,𝑡 + 𝑝𝑍,𝑡(1 − 𝑈𝑗,𝑡 − 𝑉𝑗,𝑡)𝜑𝑌𝑗,𝑡 + 𝜓2 𝑉𝑗,𝑡2𝜑𝑌𝑗,𝑡 (15) 290 
where Ω0,𝑡 = 𝛽𝑡 𝐶0𝐶𝑡 is the stochastic discount factor.  291 
The above settings and assumptions yield the following first-order conditions 292 
(more details in Appendix) 293 (1 − 𝜃𝑡) − 𝛾(Π𝑡 − 1)Πt + 𝛽𝛾𝔼t [ 𝐶𝑡𝐶𝑡+1 (Π𝑡+1 − 1)Π𝑡+1 𝑌𝑡+1𝑌𝑡 ] + 𝜃𝑡𝑀𝐶𝑡 = 0 (16) 294 
𝑍𝑗,𝑡𝑜𝑟𝑖 
𝑍𝑗,𝑡𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑙  
𝑍𝑗,𝑡𝑐𝑙𝑎𝑖𝑚𝑒𝑑 = 𝑍𝑗,𝑡𝑙𝑒𝑔𝑎𝑙 𝑍𝑗,𝑡𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑑 
𝑈𝑡,𝑗 𝑉𝑡,𝑗 
𝑍𝑗,𝑡𝑎𝑏𝑎𝑡𝑒 
1 − 𝑈𝑡,𝑗 − 𝑉𝑡,𝑗 
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𝑀𝐶𝑡 = 𝑊𝑡𝛬𝑡𝐴𝑡𝑃𝑡 + 𝜙1𝑈𝑡𝜙2 + 𝑝𝑍,𝑡(1 − 𝑈𝑡 − 𝑉𝑡)𝜑 + 𝜓2 𝑉𝑡2𝜑 (17) 295 𝑝𝑍,𝑡 = 1𝜑𝜙1𝜙2𝑈𝑡𝜙2−1 (18) 296 𝑉𝑡 = 1𝜓𝜑𝜙1𝜙2𝑈𝑡𝜙2−1 = 𝑝𝑍,𝑡𝜓 (19) 297 
where 𝑀𝐶𝑡  is the marginal cost of production, 𝛾 > 0  is the price adjusting cost 298 
coefficient, and Π𝑡 = 𝑃𝑡𝑃𝑡−1  denotes inflation. Equation (16) is the New Keynesian 299 
Phillips Curve. 300 
2.3 Monetary and Environmental Authorities 301 
The monetary policy authority (central bank) decides the nominal interest rate 302 
following a traditional Taylor rule 303 𝑅𝑡𝑅 = (Π𝑡Π )𝜌Π ( 𝑌𝑡𝑌𝑡𝑛𝑎)𝜌𝑌 (20) 304 
where 𝑌𝑡 𝑛𝑎 is the natural output without price stickiness, 𝑅 and Π are the steady 305 
state of nominal interest rate and inflation, and 𝜌Π  and 𝜌𝑌  are the intensity 306 
coefficients for targeting on inflation and output gap, respectively. The Taylor rule type 307 
monetary policy is a closer approximate of the real-world than the Ramsey monetary 308 
policy. We do not consider the latter in this research. 309 
The environmental authority decides the climate policy regime. In this research 310 
we analyse two major regimes: cap-and-trade (CA regime) and carbon tax (TX regime). 311 
Under the CA regime, the environmental authority sets an emission cap  𝑍𝑡𝑐𝑎𝑝 and 312 
sells emission permits to the market at a price decided by the market competition. In 313 
equilibrium, the total legal emissions 𝑍𝑡𝑙𝑒𝑔𝑎𝑙 equates to 𝑍𝑡𝑐𝑎𝑝. Under the TX regime, 314 
the authority sets a fixed carbon tax level for every unit of legal emissions. The authority 315 
does not set a ceiling for total legal emissions. We also include climate policy regimes 316 
of no control on emissions (NO regime) and of Ramsey optimal control (RM regime) 317 
in the following analysis, but mainly for benchmarking and comparison purpose. 318 
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Besides choosing the climate policy regime, the environmental authority fines firms if 319 
concealed emissions are spotted. The earnings of the authority, including the income 320 
from selling emission permits or levying a carbon tax and from the fines are transferred 321 
to households directly. 322 
2.4 Market Clearing and Aggregation 323 
In equilibrium, we have the market clearing condition 324 𝑌𝑡 = 𝐶𝑡 + 𝜙1𝑈𝑡𝜙2𝑌𝑡 + 𝛾2 (Π𝑡 − 1)2𝑌𝑡 (21) 325 
Following Rotemberg (1982), we assume that all the firms are symmetrical. So, the 326 
gross variables share the same form of expressions with individual variables. The total 327 
production function is 328 𝑌𝑡 = Λ𝑡𝐴𝑡𝐿𝑡 (22) 329 
The totalities of emissions are 330 𝑍𝑡𝑙𝑒𝑔𝑎𝑙 = ∫ 𝑍𝑗,𝑡𝑙𝑒𝑔𝑎𝑙𝑑𝑗10 = (1 − 𝑈𝑡 − 𝑉𝑡)𝜑𝑌𝑡 (23) 331 𝑍𝑡𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑙 = ∫ 𝑍𝑗,𝑡𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑙𝑑𝑗10 = (1 − 𝑈𝑡)𝜑𝑌𝑡 (24) 332 
The total transfer is 333 𝑇𝑡 = 𝑝𝑍,𝑡𝑍𝑡𝑙𝑒𝑔𝑎𝑙 +𝜓2 𝑣𝑡2𝜑𝑌𝑡 (25) 334 
The total stock of emissions is 335 𝑀𝑡 = (1 − 𝛿𝑀)𝑀𝑡−1 + 𝑍𝑡𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑙 + ?̃? (26) 336 
where ?̃? is the emissions from nature without human influence, and 0 < 𝛿𝑀 < 1 is 337 
the natural rate of decay of GHG stock. 338 
2.5 Calibration 339 
We calibrate the parameters as follows and list them in Table 1. Following Gali 340 
(2015), the discount factor 𝛽 is set as 0.99, the elasticity of substitution in steady state 341 𝜃 is set as 6, and the inverse of the Frisch elasticity 𝜂 is set as 1. The adjusting cost 342 
coefficient 𝛾, which measures price stickiness, is set as 58.25 so that the stickiness has 343 
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a duration of three quarters when it is converted into Calvo pricing. The disutility 344 
coefficient of labour 𝜇𝐿 is set as 24.9983 so that the steady state of labour is 0.2 345 
without monopoly. Following tradition, the persistent coefficients of shocks (including 346 
TFP shock, preference shock, and cost-push shock) are set as 0.9, and the Taylor-rule 347 
elasticities (coefficients) of monetary policy 𝜌Π  and 𝜌𝑌  are set as 1.5 and 0.5, 348 
respectively, in Section 3. Following Annicchiarico and DiDio (2017), the scale 349 
coefficient of abatement cost 𝜙1 is set as 0.185, and the elasticity 𝜙2 is set as 2.8. 350 
The parameter determining the damage caused by emissions on output 𝜒 is set as 351 
0.000457. Following Heutel (2012), the decay rate of emission stock 𝛿𝑀 is set as 352 
0.0021. Following Xu et al. (2016), the coefficient measuring the original emissions per 353 
unit of output 𝜑 is set as 0.601. As for the EOEER 𝜓, according to the proportion of 354 
the “environmental penalties” collected by the government in total GDP in China, 355 
which is approximately 0.01%,8 the 𝜓 should be approximately 0.45. This is within 356 
the magnitude of 0.1 to 1. For comparison purposes, we need to set a large 𝜓 and a 357 
small 𝜓. Considering the magnitude, the benchmark of 𝜓 (in Subsection 3.1 and 3.2) 358 
is set as 1, which is the upper bound of the magnitude, and the value describing a relative 359 
ineffective regulation is set as 0.1 (in Subsection 3.3), which is the lower bound. 360 
Table 1: Calibrated values of the parameters 361 
Parameter Value Target 𝛽 Discount factor 0.99 𝛽 = 11+𝜌 , where risk-free 
(pure time preference) 
discount rate 𝜌 ≈ 1% 𝜂 Inverse of the Frisch elasticity, 1 Literature 𝜇𝐿 Disutility coefficient of labour 24.9983 Steady labour time is 0.2 
under fully competition 
market 𝜃 Elasticity of substitution in steady 
state 
6 Literature 𝛾 Adjusting cost coefficient of sticky 58.25 Literature 
 
8 Source: The State Council of China http://www.gov.cn/xinwen/2019-02/26/content_5368758.htm  
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price 𝜌𝐴 Persistent coefficient of TFP shocks. 0.9 Commonly used value 𝜌𝑆 Persistent coefficient of preference 
shocks. 
0.9 Commonly used value 𝜌𝜃 Persistent coefficient of cost-push 
shocks. 
0.9 Commonly used value 𝜙1 Scale coefficient of abatement cost 0.185 Literature 𝜙2 Elasticity of abatement cost 2.8 Literature 𝜒 Intensity of negative externality 0.000457 Literature 𝜑 Emissions per unit of output in the 
absence of abatement 
0.601 Literature 𝜓 EOEER 0.1, 1 Proportion of environmental 
punishment cost in GDP 𝛿𝑀 Decay rate of GHG stock 0.0021 Literature 
A TFP in steady state 5.1151 Steady output is 1 under 
fully competition market 
S Preference in steady state 1 No influence at steady state 𝜌Π Policy Response to Inflation 0.5 Literature 𝜌𝑌 Policy Response to Output Gap 1.5 Literature 
3. The Mixes of Monetary Policy with Different Climate 362 
Policies 363 
In this section, we mix the monetary policy with four different types of climate 364 
policies: cap-and-trade, carbon tax, no control (with climate policy absent), and Ramsey 365 
optimal, and compare the mixes in terms of differences in fluctuation and welfare. We 366 
also consider the differences brought by the (in)effectiveness of enforcement of 367 
environmental regulation. The comparison in this section will show whether and how 368 
the monetary policy will vary when the type of climate policy and the effectiveness of 369 
environmental regulation are different. This is an extension of Annicchiarico and DiDio 370 
(2017), also a pre-requisite for optimising the policy mixes in Section 4. 371 
3.1 Fluctuation Comparison 372 
Annicchiarico and DiDio (2017) started investigating the mixes of monetary 373 
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policy and climate policy by considering one policy as the Ramsey type and the other 374 
as varying types. They showed that key macroeconomic variables, including labour, 375 
emissions, interest rate, and inflation, respond differently to a productivity shock when 376 
the policy type differs. Their work is an inspiring start on such issue, meanwhile, can 377 
be extended or improved in some respects. First, at least one policy was assumed as the 378 
Ramsey type in any mix they studied. This type of policy is the ideal optimisation but 379 
difficult to carry out directly in reality. The mix that purely consists of practically 380 
realisable policies is not studied. So, such real-world practical policy mixes can be 381 
further investigated. Second, the potential ineffectiveness of environmental regulation 382 
that could change the dynamics of the economy can be considered additionally. This 383 
relaxes the hidden assumption of the perfect effectiveness of environmental regulation. 384 
Third, the regimes with “no climate policy” and “Ramsey climate policy” can be 385 
introduced into the comparison to serve as benchmarks. 386 
We still compare the response of key macroeconomic variables to the productivity 387 
shock, but extend the work of Annicchiarico and DiDio (2017) by including the mixes 388 
of Taylor rule type monetary policy with four different types of climate policy 389 
(constituting four regimes) with consideration of the EOEER. The four types of climate 390 
policy include cap-and-trade, carbon tax, no control and Ramsey optimal (see Appendix 391 
for equations). The first three and the Taylor rule monetary policy are all commonly 392 
implemented in the real-world. In this subsection, we compare the fluctuation of the 393 
economy in different regimes via impulse response analysis. To be specific, we give a 394 
1% positive TFP shock and then find the dynamics of economic variables. Here, the 395 
EOEER 𝜓 is set as 1 as a benchmark. The values of tax level and emission target are 396 
set so that all regimes (except for the NO regime9) share the same steady state with the 397 
case of Ramsey. 398 
 
9 The No Control regime is equivalent to a TX regime with a tax level at 0. This makes the steady 
state different and predefined. 
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The results of impulse response analysis (absolute deviation from steady states) 399 
are shown in Figure 2. It can be found that the responses of endogenous variables to the 400 
shock have different paths under the four different regimes. For economic and monetary 401 
variables, output under the CA regime increases by less than under the RM regime, 402 
whereas output under the TX regime increases by more than under the RM regime. The 403 
TFP damage coefficient (𝛬𝑡 ), inflation, and the resulting interest rate under the CA 404 
regime drop less than under the RM regime, whereas under the TX regime the negative 405 
changes are larger than is the case under the RM regime. For environmental related 406 
variables, abatement, concealed emissions, and emission price under the CA regime rise 407 
by more than under the RM regime, whereas, under the TX regime they either change 408 
less than under the RM regime or do not change. Legal emissions and real emissions 409 
under the TX regime increase by more than under the RM regime, whereas, under the 410 
CA regime, real emissions rise by less than under the RM regime, and legal emissions 411 
do not change. 412 
The differences between regimes (note the scales of the y-axes) are not large, 413 
because the environmental-related disruption and costs (for abatement, emissions, and 414 
fines) are relatively small under current parameters.10 The differences could be more 415 
significant in the future if the climate change problem becomes more serious. Since it 416 
could aggravate the external shock (e.g., severer weather extremes) and increase the 417 
emission-related costs. 418 
 
10 The standard deviation of 𝛬𝑡 is less than 0.00027 under the CA and TX regimes. The proportion 
of environmental-related costs to output (GDP) at steady state is less than 0.7%. 
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 419 
Figure 2: The dynamics of endogenous variables after a 1% positive TFP shock under 420 
different regimes (EOEER=1) 421 
 422 
To understand the mechanism behind the differences of the changes, we first need 423 
to understand that after a positive TFP shock, emission prices and real emissions will 424 
rise under the RM regime. When the shock happens, every unit of output will have a 425 
lower cost. This decreases the price level and increases the demand. An increased 426 
demand causes an increased supply or output. When the level of output increases, the 427 
original emissions from production also increase. This can cause a higher marginal 428 
damage to TFP, so the Ramsey optimization requires a higher rate of abatement 𝑈𝑡. 429 
According to equation (18), the emission price 𝒑𝒁,𝒕  also needs to be higher 430 
simultaneously under the RM regime. To dispose of the extra original emissions from 431 
production under the RM regime, firms will be arranged to use all three channels — 432 
namely abating, legally emitting, and concealedly emitting — as all the channels have 433 
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an increasing marginal cost for society. Hence, abatement, legal emissions, and 434 
concealed emissions will all rise. As a result, real emissions, which equates to the sum 435 
of legal and concealed emissions, will also rise under the RM regime.  436 
Then, the differences between the CA and TX regimes can be explained. Under 437 
the TX regime (and the NO regime), the emission prices (for legal emissions) are fixed 438 
at the carbon tax level (or 0), irrespective of how much firms emit. After a shock, this 439 
is lower than the Ramsey optimal (increased) emission price. The relative lower 440 
emission price has three implications: (1) On output. As the emission price is fixed, its 441 
marginal level is also fixed and equates to the tax level. At optimum, the costs of all 442 
three channels for disposing of the original emissions from production share this same 443 
marginal level. The costs for disposing of every unit of emissions via concealed 444 
emitting and abatement are marginal increasing; hence, the average cost of these two 445 
channels is lower than the tax level. Given that the tax level is lower than is the Ramsey 446 
optimal emission price, the average cost for disposing of every unit of emission via all 447 
three channels is less than is the case under the RM regime. When the unit emission 448 
cost is lower, the price level decreases, which causes a higher demand for production 449 
output. So, it is higher than is the case under the RM regime. (2) On real emissions and 450 
the TFP damage coefficient. The relatively lower costs of disposing of legal and 451 
concealed emissions allow real emissions, which is the sum of legal and concealed 452 
emissions, to rise by more than is the case under the RM regime. Real emissions 453 
accumulate into emission stock and directly decrease the TFP damage coefficient (N.B., 454 
it is negative). Therefore, the TFP damage coefficient drops by more than it does under 455 
the RM regime. (3) On legal emissions, abatement, and concealed emissions. With a 456 
lower emission price, the legal emissions increase by more than they would under the 457 
RM regime. When relatively more original emissions from production are disposed of 458 
via the legal emitting channel, a lesser amount of emissions need to be disposed of via 459 
the other two channels, namely abating and concealed emitting. This causes the 460 
abatement and concealed emissions to increase by less than is the case under the RM 461 
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regime. (4) On inflation and interest rate. A lower than RM regime emission price 462 
causes a lower marginal cost of production, and then a lower inflation and lower interest 463 
rate in succession. Hence, both the change in inflation and the change in interest rate 464 
are lower than their changes under the RM regime. 465 
Under the CA regime, the mechanism of change is the antithesis of that under the 466 
TX regime. The legal emissions volume is fixed at a target, so it is lower than the new 467 
Ramsey optimal (increased) legal emissions’ level. After the shock and the rise of 468 
original emissions, the concealed emitting and abatement channels need to dispose of 469 
more emissions than is the case under the RM regime. This leads to higher marginal 470 
disposing costs of these two channels. At optimum, the costs of all three channels for 471 
disposing of the original emissions share a same marginal level, hence the emission 472 
price (for legal emissions) rises higher than is the case under the RM regime. The higher 473 
than RM regime emission price (which is opposite to the lower than RM regime price 474 
under the TX regime) has implications for the endogenous variable that are exactly 475 
antithetical to those under the TX regime. Therefore, there are differences in the 476 
changes between the CA and TX regimes. Meanwhile, we can say that there exists a 477 
“price level-offsetting” effect in the CA regime that can better stabilise the economy 478 
when a shock happens. This is because the fixed legal emission volume causes a 479 
higher/lower price for disposing of emissions and offsets the lowering/heightening price 480 
level (and also attenuates monetary policy). Under the TX regime, the fixed carbon 481 
price does not have such a function.  482 
In general, the above analysis shows that when monetary policy is mixed with 483 
different climate policies, the monetary policy itself (interest rate) and the effect of the 484 
policies on the economy (other endogenous variables) will differ in facing a TPF shock. 485 
Under the TX regime, the monetary policy (interest rate) is strengthened compared with 486 
under the RM regime and, meanwhile, the TX regime-type climate policy is looser than 487 
is the RM regime-type (real emissions too high and abatement too low). Conversely, 488 
under the CA regime the monetary policy is weakened; the CA regime-type climate 489 
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policy is tighter than is the RM regime-type.  490 
The above analysis conveys two key messages: (1) The cap-and-trade regime of 491 
climate policy could offset the price fluctuation after shocks and become an attenuator 492 
for monetary policy. (2) The making process of monetary policy should consider the 493 
existing regime of climate policy, as the dynamic of monetary policy is influenced by 494 
the selection of climate policy.  495 
3.2 Welfare Comparison 496 
To further investigate the above policy mixes, we compare the welfare of the four 497 
regimes in addition to the above fluctuation analysis. This will help us find which of 498 
the four mixes are better and which are worse.  499 
In the comparison, we maintain all parameters, including the coefficients in the 500 
Taylor rule and the EOEER, fixed. We set the steady states of the CA and TX regimes 501 
equal to that of the RM regime. The steady state of the NO regime comes from the 502 𝑝𝑍,𝑡 = 0 case of the TX regime. So, the differences in welfare between the CA, TX, 503 
and RM regimes are due only to the difference in regime. We follow the welfare 504 
criterion of Mendicino and Pescatori (2007) and calculate the conditional welfare of 505 
individuals. The expression is 506 
𝑊𝑗 = 𝔼𝑡 ∑ 𝛽𝑚 (ln 𝐶𝑗,𝑡+𝑚 − 𝜇𝐿 𝐿𝑗,𝑡+𝑚1+𝜂1 + 𝜂)∞𝑚=0 (27) 507 
where 𝑊𝑗  is the conditional welfare, and 𝑗 = {NO, TX, CA, RM}   means the four 508 
regimes of climate policy: no control, carbon tax, cap-and-trade, and Ramsey optimal.  509 
To show results more intuitive, we also calculate the consumption equivalent (CE) 510 
of each case. CE is the additional fraction of consumption that households under no 511 
policy can obtain if a certain policy is introduced for them. Let 512 𝑊𝑗′ = 𝔼𝑡 ∑ 𝛽𝑚 [ln(1 + 𝐶𝐸𝑗′)𝐶𝑁𝑂,𝑡+𝑚 − 𝜇𝐿 𝐿𝑁𝑂,𝑡+𝑚1+𝜂1+𝜂 ]∞𝑚=0 (28)  513 
we have 514 
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𝐶𝐸𝑗′ = exp{(1 − 𝛽)(𝑊𝑗′ −𝑊𝑁𝑂)} − 1 (29) 515 
where  𝑗′ = {TX, CA, RM} represents a certain regime of climate policy. 516 
The welfares of all four regimes and the corresponding CEs are shown in Table 2. 517 
Table 2: Welfare and Consumption Equivalents of the four regimes 518 
 
Welfare CE 
NO -59.469 0 
TX -58.583 0.0088972 
CA -58.585 0.0088727 
RM -58.566 0.0090715 
 519 
We can find 520 𝑊𝑅𝑀 > 𝑊𝑇𝑋 > 𝑊𝐶𝐴 > 𝑊𝑁𝑂 (30) 521 
and 522 𝐶𝐸𝑅𝑀 > 𝐶𝐸𝑇𝑋 > 𝐶𝐸𝐶𝐴 > 𝐶𝐸𝑁𝑂 (31) 523 
Specifically: (1) Any regime with a climate policy has better welfare than has the 524 
NO regime, as any climate policy can somehow reduce emissions, and so does its 525 
externality. (2) The RM regime has the highest welfare and CE of all the regimes. This 526 
is the nature of Ramsey policy. (3) The TX regime is a little better than is the CA regime 527 
in terms of welfare and CE; however, the differences between them are not big. 528 
In terms of the welfare standard, the TX regime tends to be a better choice among 529 
the three real-world implementable regimes (CA, TX, and NO) when a TFP shock 530 
happens. However, sensitivity analysis indicates that it is not always the best choice. 531 
We find that either when the parameter EOEER is small enough or when the shock is 532 
changed to demand-type, the result 𝑊𝑇𝑋 > 𝑊𝐶𝐴 and 𝐶𝐸𝑇𝑋 > 𝐶𝐸𝐶𝐴 will reverse to 533 𝑊𝑇𝑋 < 𝑊𝐶𝐴 and 𝐶𝐸𝑇𝑋 < 𝐶𝐸𝐶𝐴 . Hence, among the three real-world implementable 534 
regimes, no one is always dominant over others regardless of parameters and shocks, 535 
in terms of the welfare standard. 536 
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3.3 The Role of Environment Regulatory Effectiveness 537 
This section investigates whether the effectiveness of enforcement of 538 
environmental regulation, in addition to the choice of climate policy type, will also 539 
affect the economy and the monetary policy. 540 
To do this, we set a lower effectiveness parameter 𝜓 equal to 0.1. This is a much 541 
smaller value than the benchmark case in Subsection 3.1, where 𝜓 = 1 . The small 542 
value means that the environmental regulation is less effective. In Figure 3, we show 543 
the fluctuation of economy following the same method as in Subsection 3.1. It needs to 544 
be noted that the units of some of the vertical axes in Figure 2 and Figure 3 are different. 545 
Then, we compare the results in Figure 2 (𝜓 = 1) and in Figure 3 (𝜓 = 0.1) to identify 546 
any differences arising from the effectiveness of enforcement of environmental 547 
regulation. 548 
It can be found, for variables apart from legal and concealed emissions, that when 549 
the effectiveness is lower the differences of fluctuation between the CA and TX regimes 550 
become smaller — mainly because the variables’ paths under the CA regime are more 551 
approximate to the paths under the TX regime. Under the TX regime, legal emissions 552 
change by more than is the case when environmental regulation is more effective. Under 553 
the CA regime, concealed emissions change more. This makes the mixes with different 554 
regimes of climate policy become more similar to each other. 555 
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 556 
Figure 3: The dynamics of endogenous variables after a 1% positive TFP shock under 557 
different regimes (EOEER=0.1) 558 
  559 
The pivotal reason for the diminishing differences between regimes is that the less 560 
effective enforcement of environmental regulation gives firms more space to dispose of 561 
their emissions via the concealed emitting channel and the “price level-offsetting” effect 562 
in the CA regime is weakened. When 𝜓 is lower, the unit cost for concealed emissions 563 
and the total cost for disposing of every unit of original emissions will decrease. This 564 
allows the steady state share of concealed emissions in original emissions (i.e. 𝑉𝑡) and 565 
original emissions to increase. After a TFP shock under the TX regime, concealed 566 
emissions rise by more than is the case with higher 𝜓 because of the increased steady 567 
state 𝑉𝑡 . The path of abatement is almost unchanged because the extra original 568 
emissions after a shock do not change significantly, and the share of abatement for 569 
disposing of every unit of original emissions (i.e., 𝑈𝑡 ) is not changed according to 570 
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equation (18), which does not include 𝜓. Neither does the path of real emissions, whose 571 
share is 1 − 𝑈𝑡, change significantly, for the same reason. The legal emissions rise by 572 
less because their share in disposing of every unit of original emissions 1 − 𝑈𝑡 − 𝑉𝑡 is 573 
reduced due to an increased 𝑉𝑡 . The paths of inflation and interest rate are almost 574 
unchanged due to a fixed 𝑝𝑍,𝑡 under the TX regime. 575 
After a TFP shock under the CA regime, 𝑝𝑍,𝑡 increases by less than is the case 576 
when 𝜓 is higher, as the cost for concealed emissions rises by less.11 The “price level-577 
offsetting” effect is weakened. This brings more similar changes in the paths of inflation 578 
and the interest rate. Illegal emissions rise by more than is the case with a higher 𝜓 for 579 
the same reason under the TX regime. Abatement increases by less as more original 580 
emissions are disposed of via the concealed emitting channel. Real emissions rise by 581 
more because the concealed emissions increase by more and the legal emissions are 582 
fixed under the CA regime. 583 
In addition to the fluctuation analysis, we also calculate and compare the welfare 584 
of each regime after the EOEER is changed to 0.1. We find that the order of welfare 585 
and the consumption equivalent comparison will change to 𝑊𝐸𝑇 > 𝑊𝑇𝑋 and 𝐶𝐸𝐶𝐴 >586 𝐶𝐸𝑇𝑋. The reason is that consumption, as one of the determinants of welfare, increases 587 
by more under the CA regime than under the TX regime. A lower 𝜓 brings a lower 588 
cost for concealed emissions. Under the CA regime this also brings a lower 𝑝𝑍,𝑡. Then, 589 
the price level decreases and demand, production output, and consumption increase. 590 
However, under the TX regime, 𝑝𝑍,𝑡 is fixed, and, hence, the price level decreases by 591 
less than is the case under CA. Then, consumption does not rise by so much.12 The 592 
 
11 There is a marginal increasing cost for concealed emissions 𝜓2 𝑣𝑡,𝑗2 𝜑𝑌𝑗,𝑡. When 𝜓 is lower, the 
steady state cost for concealed emissions is lower. Hence, the cost for concealed emissions rises less here. 
Meanwhile, the three channels for disposing of original pollution have the same marginal cost (a natural 
result of economic optimisation); hence 𝑝𝑍,𝑡 equals the cost for concealed emissions. 
12 The fluctuation of price also influences welfare, according to Rotemberg (1982). However, the 
result here means that the influence of consumption on welfare is stronger. 
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output under the CA regime rises more than it does under the TX regime, after a shock, 593 
which makes the output gap under the CA regime relatively smaller and the welfare 594 
larger.  595 
The above analysis shows that the ineffectiveness of enforcement of environmental 596 
regulation will make climate policy less effective and that different regimes become 597 
more similar. This implies that the difference in the fluctuation of economy and 598 
monetary policy between regimes will also change due to the differentiation of EOEER. 599 
Therefore, in addition to the regime of climate policy, the EOEER also needs to be 600 
considered when designing monetary policy. Otherwise, the dynamics of monetary 601 
policy and its effect on the economy will be somewhat different (too strong or too weak) 602 
from what is envisaged with only considering the regime of climate policy. Another 603 
implication is that, when making monetary policy, developed countries should consider 604 
the existing regime of climate policy more carefully than developing countries, as their 605 
effectiveness of environmental regulation is often better and the differences between 606 
regimes are more significant. 607 
4. The Optimisation of Policy Mixes 608 
From Subsection 3.2, it can be found that, among the three real-world 609 
implementable regimes of policy mix (CA, TX, and NO), no one is always dominant 610 
over others, in terms of the welfare standard. In this section, we propose to improve or 611 
“optimise” these regimes respectively. The first way is to optimise policy coefficients 612 
in the traditional Taylor rule of monetary policy. The second and also a novel way is to 613 
introduce a radically “climate-augmented” monetary policy. This is to include the 614 
emission gap target into the Taylor rule of monetary policy. We will try to find the best 615 
coefficient for the new target and determine whether this inclusion can become a 616 
desirable practice. The results will give an answer to central banks’ question of 617 
“whether it is good for the monetary authority to proactively care for the climate”. 618 
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4.1 Optimisation in the Traditional Monetary Policy 619 
The Ramsey optimal monetary policy, which has been investigated by 620 
Annicchiarico and DiDio (2017), constitutes the ideally optimal policy mix. However, 621 
as this kind of policy assumes that all endogenous variables in the economy can be 622 
controlled and adjusted by the authority, it is difficult for policy makers to carry out in 623 
reality. We do not work more on it here. For real-world implementable climate policy 624 
regimes (CA, TX, and NO), Subsection 3.2 showed that no one is always dominant.  625 
In this subsection, our way to improve or to “optimise” the policy mix is to first 626 
choose a certain regime that is real-world implementable, then optimise the policy 627 
coefficients in them. To do this, we have three potential options. The first is to give a 628 
fixed strength of climate policy and optimise the coefficients in the Taylor rule of 629 
monetary policy (𝜌𝑌 and 𝜌Π). The second is to fix the monetary policy coefficients 630 
and optimise the climate policy strength. The third is to optimise the climate strength 631 
and the monetary coefficients simultaneously. We choose the first method because this 632 
research is on the angle of central banks. The second method is on the angle of 633 
environmental regulator. The third approach is more comprehensive but is also more 634 
complex and difficult for policy makers to coordinate and carry out.  635 
To calculate, we first combine different values of monetary policy coefficients 636 
with different types of climate policy (CA or TX13) under different EOEER and shocks. 637 
Shocks include TFP, cost-push, and preference shocks, considering that these three can 638 
cover both supply- and demand-side shocks. Then, we derive the welfare and CE of 639 
every combination. The policy coefficients 𝜌π  and 𝜌𝑌 that maximise the welfare and 640 
CE of a certain combination of climate policy, EOEER, and shock, if exist, is the 641 
optimised policy coefficients for it. For simplicity, we only consider the regimes that 642 
can solve the model with a unique solution. 643 
We find that under a cost-push shock (a positive 𝜃𝑡 shock), there exist optimal 644 
 
13 We do not incorporate the NO regime as Subsection 3.2 showed that it is always an inferior one. 
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monetary policy coefficients for every climate policy and EOEER, as shown in Table 645 
3. This means that if the cost-push shock is dominant in the economy, the central bank 646 
has the best choice of coefficients in the Taylor rule of monetary policy, when climate 647 
policy and EOEER are given. 648 
Table 3: Optimal policy coefficients in the Taylor rule of monetary policy under 649 
different climate policies and EOEER (cost-push shock) 650 𝜑 
(EOEER) 
Cap-and-Trade Carbon Tax 𝜌π  𝜌𝑌 𝜌π  𝜌𝑌 
0.1 3.2335 0.4573 3.4792 0.4591 
0.5 2.8024 0.4573 3.4948 0.4593 
1 2.6819 0.4589 3.4969 0.4593 
10 2.5549 0.4619 3.4984 0.4593 
100 2.5418 0.4624 3.4985 0.4591 
 651 
Table 3 shows that 𝜌𝑌 does not vary significantly across climate policy regimes; 652 
however, 𝜌Π is always larger under the TX regime than under the CA regime. This is 653 
because the emission price in the CA regime changes when a shock happens. When a 654 
cost-push shock (a positive 𝜃𝑡 shock) happens, the price level becomes lower, which 655 
increases demand, production output, and emissions. The higher emissions then lead to 656 
an increase in the price for disposing of emissions under the CA regime (see Subsection 657 
3.1 for details). Hence, the price level under the TX regime (which is fixed) is relatively 658 
lower than is the case under the CA regime. To suppress deflation, a stronger 𝜌Π is 659 
needed. This again shows the “price level-offsetting” effect in the CA regime and the 660 
basic mechanism that differentiates the two climate regimes. Table 3 also shows that 661 
across different EOEER, only 𝜌π  under the CA regime goes lower significantly when 662 
EOEER increases. This is because a higher EOEER pushes up the cost for concealed 663 
emissions and increases the demand for legal emissions. Under the CA regime, the 664 
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emission permit price 𝑝𝑍,𝑡 increases more, offsetting the decrease of price level more 665 
after the cost-push shock. So, the strength of inflation targeting, 𝜌Π, could be eased.  666 
Under TFP or preference shocks, we find that the welfare and CE become higher 667 
when 𝜌π  and 𝜌𝑌 become larger. This is a common result of the New-Keynesian 668 
model. However, this means there are no optimal values of 𝜌π  and 𝜌𝑌 if the ranges 669 
of the coefficients are not limited and a TFP (or preference) shock is dominant in the 670 
economy. 671 
To summarise, we find that when climate policy is considered in the framework, 672 
the monetary policy can always be improved by adjusting the Taylor rule coefficients. 673 
If a cost-push shock is dominant in the economy, optimal coefficients exist. Both the 674 
climate policy regime and the EOEER can affect the value of the optimal coefficients. 675 
At this point, we can report that when the existing climate policy is brought into the 676 
framework of the central bank’s policy making, at least three things can be considered 677 
to improve the monetary policy: the type (regime) of climate policy, the EOEER, and 678 
the coefficient in the Taylor rule of monetary policy. 679 
4.2 The “Climate-Augmented” Monetary Policy 680 
In this subsection, we propose a radical way to improve the traditional policy 681 
mixes. This is to change the form of the Taylor rule of monetary policy by incorporating 682 
the emission gap target into it and create a so called “climate-augmented” monetary 683 
policy. We will search the best coefficient for the new target and determine whether this 684 
introduction can become a good practice. This will give an answer to central banks’ 685 
question of “whether it is good for the monetary authority to proactively care for the 686 
climate”. 687 
Our method is to add the emission gap as the third target into the traditional 688 
inflation and output gap targeting Taylor rule. The emission gap is the relative deviation 689 
of current real emissions to the ideal real emissions (we use the steady state real 690 
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emissions calculated under Ramsey optimal climate policy14). It is an analogue to the 691 
inflation and output gap target and is a typical form. The new form of the Taylor rule is 692 𝑅𝑡𝑅 = (Π𝑡Π )𝜌Π ( 𝑌𝑡𝑌𝑡𝑛𝑎)𝜌𝑌 (𝑍𝑡−1𝑍 )𝜌𝑍 (32) 693 
where 𝑌𝑡 𝑛𝑎 is the natural output without nominal price stickiness, 𝑅, Π, and 𝑍 are 694 
the steady states of nominal interest rate, inflation rate, and real emissions, respectively. 695 𝑍𝑡−1 represents the current real emissions. We assume that the authority uses 𝑍𝑡−1, not 696 𝑍𝑡, to represent the current real emissions since real emissions includes the concealed 697 
emissions which often cannot be detected during the period of policy making (period 698 𝑡). The emission gap target is not a replication of the output gap target as we use the 699 
real emissions in it, not the original emissions who are proportional to output. Real 700 
emissions incorporate abatement and is the ultimate factor that influences the 701 
environment and, thus, can directly reflect the climate objective. 𝜌𝑍 is the intensity 702 
coefficients for targeting on the emission gap. This new form of Taylor rule makes the 703 
monetary policy proactively care for the climate. 704 
Then, we set the strength of the traditional target of monetary policy (i.e. the 705 
inflation and the output coefficient) as fixed: 𝜌𝑌 = 0.5 and 𝜌Π = 1.5, and calculate 706 
welfare values of the economy with different 𝜌𝑍 and different shocks.15 𝜌𝑍 takes 707 
every value in the interval that can produce a unique solution for the equilibrium. 708 
Common shocks (TFP, cost-push, and preference) that cover both supply- and demand-709 
side shocks are introduced respectively. Under a same shock, if the welfare with a 𝜌𝑍 710 
is higher than is the welfare with 𝜌𝑍 = 0, a 𝜌𝑍  that can improve the policy mix is 711 
found. As 𝜌𝑌 and 𝜌Π are fixed and allowing 𝜌𝑍 to change is introducing a new 712 
 
14 A more intuitive “ideal real emissions” is the carbon budget measured against the 1.5℃ (or lower) 
target. However, the calculation requires some reliable data in natural science which is currently 
unavailable. 
15 A more comprehensive method is to simultaneously optimise the three targets. We do not do it in 
this research as our method is enough when we give the condition “the strength of the traditional Taylor 
rule target of monetary policy is given” in the conclusion. 
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dimension for optimisation, there must be some 𝜌𝑍 that can improve the welfare. It 713 
will serve as a supplement of the potentially either over-strong or over-weak 𝜌𝑌 and 714 𝜌Π.  715 
Applying the above method, we can find the intervals of 𝜌𝑍 that can improve the 716 
welfare, as well as the values of 𝜌𝑍 that can enhance the welfare at the greatest extent 717 
(define as “the best value of 𝜌𝑍”) under different regimes and different shocks. Results 718 
using parameters calibrated in Subsection 2.5 shown in Table 4. When the TFP or cost-719 
push shock is dominant, the best 𝜌𝑍 is negative in both climate regimes. When the 720 
preference shock is dominant, the best 𝜌𝑍 lies in the right boundary of possible values, 721 
which means that the higher the 𝜌𝑍, the higher the welfare.  722 
Table 4: The interval of 𝜌𝑍 that can improve welfare and the best 𝜌𝑍 under different 723 
climate policies and shocks (original price stickiness) 724 
Shock 
Cap-and-Trade Carbon Tax 
Interval Best Interval Best 
TFP shock (-0.866, 0) -0.453 (-0.174, 0) -0.091 
Cost-push shock (-0.509, 0) -0.261 (-0.12, 0) -0.062 
Preference shock The higher the better 
 725 
However, sensitivity analysis shows that under TFP or cost-push shock, the best 726 𝜌𝑍 can also be positive under different parameter values. For example, if the price 727 
stickiness parameter 𝛾 is large enough [e.g., 10 times larger, which is roughly in line 728 
with Gertler et al. (2019)], the best 𝜌𝑍 becomes positive under both regimes with a 729 
cost-push shock, as shown in Table 5.  730 
 731 
 732 
 733 
 734 
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Table 5: The interval of 𝜌𝑍 that can improve welfare and best 𝜌𝑍 under different 735 
climate policies and shocks (price stickiness 10 times larger) 736 
Shock 
Cap-and-Trade Carbon Tax 
Interval Best Interval Best 
TFP shock (-0.934, 0) -0.508 (-0.16, 0) -0.087 
Cost-push shock (0, 1.342) 0.602 (0, 0.184) 0.085 
Preference shock The higher the better 
 737 
We must point out that when the interval of 𝜌𝑍 that can improve welfare is 738 
negative, there is a dilemma between the welfare objective and the environmental 739 
objective. Suppose a positive TFP or cost-push shock happens, then the emission gap 740 
is positive due to the lower price level, higher output, and higher emissions. With a 741 
negative 𝜌𝑍 , a lower interest rate will be derived, which encourages demand and 742 
production, fulfilling the welfare objective. However, the higher production causes 743 
higher emissions, which is adverse to the environmental objective. On the contrary, if 744 
we change the 𝜌𝑍 to a positive value to realise the environmental objective (emission 745 
gap), then it deviates from the interval that can improve welfare. Failing to enhance 746 
welfare is incompatible with the fundamental purpose of a central bank. This is the 747 
potential dilemma that emerges to a central bank if they add the emission gap target into 748 
the traditional monetary policy.  749 
The above analysis gives an answer to the question “whether a central bank should 750 
adopt ‘climate-augmented’ (emission gap targeting) monetary policy” or “whether it is 751 
good for the monetary authority to proactively care for the climate”. If the interval of 752 
the new target’s coefficient (𝜌𝑍) that can improve welfare consists of a positive part, it 753 
is good to do so by adding the emission gap target into the Taylor rule of monetary 754 
policy and setting the targeting coefficient as a value in the positive interval. If the 755 
interval consists of only negative values, it is not good to add the emission gap target 756 
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into the Taylor rule. 757 
Based on the above results and the real-world circumstance, we do not suggest 758 
central banks to add the new climate target (the emission gap target) into the Taylor rule 759 
of monetary policy without further reviews. Considering that the welfare improving 760 
interval of 𝜌𝑍 is not fixed and is determined by many uncertain factors including deep 761 
parameters, the regime of climate policy, and the type of shock, a central bank cannot 762 
assure that the climate augmented Taylor rule monetary policy always does not bring 763 
the dilemma between the welfare and the environmental objective. Meanwhile, many 764 
central banks in the real-world are already overburdened with multiple targets other 765 
than price stability and employment. 766 
This subsection shows that, when the strength of the traditional Taylor rule target 767 
of monetary policy is given, incorporating the emission gap target into the rule and 768 
setting the coefficient of the new target in a specific interval can improve the policy mix 769 
in terms of the welfare standard. The best value of the coefficient for emission targeting 770 
is found under different situations (given the coefficients for inflation and output gap 771 
targeting fixed). However, under some circumstances, this radically “climate-772 
augmented” monetary policy will create a dilemma between the welfare and the 773 
environmental objectives, making it less valuable of recommendation for central banks 774 
to adopt without further reviews. 775 
4.3 A Discussion 776 
Although the “climate-augmented” (emission gap targeting) monetary policy is 777 
found to be controversial above, it does not mean that this kind of monetary policy is 778 
useless from other points of view. The DSGE model is used mainly for fluctuation 779 
analysis, so the conclusions are based on short-term standards. Climate change can be 780 
characterized as a long-term challenge for mankind. Considering that “climate-781 
augmented” monetary policy of certain forms can limit emission and reduce future 782 
climate risks, it could become a preferable choice for policy makers in the long-run. 783 
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From the modelling prospective, the reasons include: First, the steady state welfare 784 
could be higher if emission is limited. This can compensate for the welfare loss shown 785 
in the fluctuation analysis. Second, a lower climate risk increases economic stability 786 
and decreases welfare loss brought by fluctuation. 787 
The above results neither means that central banks should not proactively care for 788 
the climate by measures other than the narrow monetary policy (interest rate). Climate 789 
change can bring physical and transition risks to firms so that can cause financial and 790 
economic instability. Safeguarding financial and economic stability is a major mandate 791 
of most central banks. They could use macroprudential and other regulatory policy tools, 792 
such as environmental stress testing and green asset purchase, and play a coordinating 793 
role among regulators and the market to fulfil this mandate in facing climate change. 794 
5. Conclusion 795 
In this paper, we have studied the relationship between and the mix of monetary 796 
and climate policy. By using an Environmental Dynamic Stochastic General 797 
Equilibrium (E-DSGE) model augmented with a range of emissions including what we 798 
call concealed emissions and related regulations, we have compared the mixes of Taylor 799 
rule-based monetary policy with different climate policies to find whether and how 800 
climate policy will influence monetary policy; this paper optimised the coefficients in 801 
the monetary policy rule under certain climate policies; and proposed a “climate-802 
augmented” monetary policy and investigated if and when it can be a good choice for 803 
the central bank. All these provide insights for central banks who are considering their 804 
engagement in the climate change issue. 805 
The main findings consist of three parts. First, the dynamics of monetary policy 806 
and the economy are influenced by the selection of regimes of climate policy and the 807 
effectiveness of enforcement of environmental regulation (EOEER). The pivotal reason 808 
is that the cap-and-trade regime can offset the price fluctuation after shocks, whereas 809 
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the carbon tax regime cannot. The effectiveness of environmental regulation also plays 810 
a role, as it can make climate policy less effective by providing more space for 811 
concealed emissions. Therefore, the making process of monetary policy should consider 812 
the existing climate policy and environmental regulation. Developed countries should 813 
consider the climate policy more carefully than do the developing ones.  814 
Second, the coefficients in the traditional Taylor rule of monetary policy can always 815 
be better set to enhance welfare when a certain regime of climate policy is considered 816 
in the economy. If the cost-push shock is dominant in the economy, optimal coefficients 817 
exist. Both the climate policy regime and the effectiveness of environmental regulation 818 
can affect the value of the optimal coefficients. We can summarise from the above that, 819 
under the framework with climate factors, at least three aspects can be considered to 820 
improve the monetary policy: the type (regime) of climate policy, the effectiveness of 821 
enforcement of environmental regulation, and the coefficients of the inflation and 822 
output gap targets in the Taylor rule of monetary policy. 823 
Third, the welfare of the economy can be enhanced by adding the target of emission 824 
gap into the rule of monetary policy and setting the coefficient of the new target in a 825 
specific interval, when the strength of the traditional Taylor rule target of monetary 826 
policy is given. The best value of the coefficient for targeting can be found under 827 
different scenarios. However, under some circumstances, this radically “climate-828 
augmented” (emission gap targeting) monetary policy is likely to create a dilemma 829 
between the welfare and the environmental objectives. If we do not want central banks 830 
to take the risk of such dilemma, it is better not to introduce the climate target into the 831 
monetary policy rule without further reviews. Central banks could and should use 832 
measures other than the narrow monetary policy (interest rate) to proactively care for 833 
the climate. 834 
The above findings give insights to the initial question of this paper “Should central 835 
banks engage in the climate change issue?” — The making process of monetary policy 836 
should consider the existing climate policy; otherwise, the dynamic of monetary policy 837 
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and its effect on the economy will be different from what is originally envisaged. 838 
However, it is not recommended for central banks to add the climate (emission gap) 839 
target into the narrow monetary policy at the current stage, as this may create a dilemma 840 
for them. 841 
 This research can be extended in several aspects. For example: (1) Set the EOEER 842 
as a shock to study the “transition risk” brought by climate change and the tightening 843 
process of environmental regulation (e.g., China’s environmental inspection). (2) Set a 844 
dynamic rule (e.g., the Taylor rule) for climate policy. (3) Improve the form of climate 845 
target in the monetary policy rule (e.g., use an ideal real emission that is in line with the 846 
1.5℃ climate target). (4) Introduce more types of shocks (e.g., climate change shock 847 
after the tipping point). (5) Introduce more financial fractions and constraints (e.g. zero 848 
lower bound of interest rate) to describe the role of monetary policy more precisely. (6) 849 
Along with the monetary policy, introduce and study more policy tools and measures 850 
that central banks can use to mitigate climate risk and support the green economic 851 
transition [e.g., identifying green financing and differentiating reserve rate requirements, 852 
re-lending and collateral requirements (Pan, 2019), green asset purchase and credit 853 
guidance]. (7) Find whether the three-target “climate-augmented” monetary policy is 854 
better than the traditional two-target policy when all the Taylor rule coefficients in them 855 
are simultaneously optimised. 856 
  857 
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Appendix 858 
Derivation of the New Keynesian Phillips Curve 859 
The maximisation problem of firm 𝑗 is 860 
{  
  
   
 𝑉0 = max𝔼0 { 
 ∑Ω0,𝑡 [𝑃𝑗,𝑡𝑃𝑡 𝑌𝑗,𝑡 − 𝑇𝐶𝑗,𝑡 − 𝛾2( 𝑃𝑗,𝑡𝑃𝑗,𝑡−1 − 1)2 𝑌𝑡]∞𝑡=0 } 
 
𝑠. 𝑡. {  
  𝑇𝐶𝑗,𝑡 = 𝑊𝑡𝑃𝑡 𝐿𝑗,𝑡 + 𝜙1𝑈𝑗,𝑡𝜙2𝑌𝑗,𝑡 + 𝑝𝑍,𝑡(1 − 𝑈𝑗,𝑡 − 𝑉𝑗,𝑡)𝜑𝑌𝑗,𝑡 + 𝜓2 𝑉𝑗,𝑡2𝜑𝑌𝑗,𝑡𝑌𝑗,𝑡 = Λ𝑡𝐴𝑡𝐿𝑗,𝑡𝑌𝑗,𝑡 = (𝑃𝑗,𝑡𝑃𝑡 )− 𝜃𝑡 𝑌𝑡  
 861 
We can rewrite the objective function by the Bellman Equation as 862 𝑉𝑡 = max {𝑃𝑗,𝑡𝑃𝑡 𝑌𝑗,𝑡 − 𝑇𝐶𝑗,𝑡 − 𝛾2( 𝑃𝑗,𝑡𝑃𝑗,𝑡−1 − 1)2 𝑌𝑡 + 𝔼𝑡𝛺𝑡,𝑡+1𝑉𝑡+1} 863 
which yields the Lagrangian function as 864 ℒ𝑡 = 𝑃𝑗,𝑡𝑃𝑡 𝑌𝑗,𝑡 − [𝑊𝑡𝑃𝑡 𝑌𝑗,𝑡Λ𝑡𝐴𝑡 + 𝜙1𝑈𝑗,𝑡𝜙2𝑌𝑗,𝑡 + 𝑝𝑍,𝑡(1 − 𝑈𝑗,𝑡 − 𝑉𝑗,𝑡)𝜑𝑌𝑗,𝑡 + 𝜓2 𝑉𝑗,𝑡2𝜑𝑌𝑗,𝑡]865 − 𝛾2( 𝑃𝑗,𝑡𝑃𝑗,𝑡−1 − 1)2 𝑌𝑡 + 𝔼𝑡[𝛺𝑡,𝑡+1𝑉𝑡+1] + 𝜆𝑗,𝑡 [(𝑃𝑗,𝑡𝑃𝑡 )− 𝜃𝑡 𝑌𝑡 − 𝑌𝑗,𝑡] 866 
where 𝛺𝑡,𝑡+1 = 𝛽 𝐶𝑡𝐶𝑡+1 is the stochastic discount factor. So, we can obtain the FOC for 867 𝑈𝑗,𝑡 and 𝑉𝑗,𝑡 868 𝑝𝑍,𝑡 = 𝜙1𝜙2𝜑 𝑈𝑗,𝑡𝜙2−1 869 𝑉𝑗,𝑡 = 𝑝𝑍,𝑡𝜓  870 
and derive 871 𝑀𝐶𝑗,𝑡 = 𝑊𝑡𝑃𝑡 1Λ𝑡𝐴𝑡 + 𝜙1𝑈𝑗,𝑡𝜙2 + 𝑝𝑍,𝑡(1 − 𝑈𝑗,𝑡 − 𝑉𝑗,𝑡)𝜑 + 𝜓2 𝑉𝑗,𝑡2𝜑 872 
The FOCs for 𝑃𝑗,𝑡 and 𝑌𝑗,𝑡 derive 873 1 − 𝜃𝑡 − 𝛾 ( 𝑃𝑗,𝑡𝑃𝑗,𝑡−1 − 1) 𝑃𝑗,𝑡𝑃𝑗,𝑡−1 + 𝛽𝛾𝔼𝑡 [(𝑃𝑗,𝑡+1𝑃𝑗,𝑡 − 1)𝑃𝑗,𝑡+1𝑃𝑗,𝑡 𝐶𝑡𝐶𝑡+1 𝑌𝑡+1𝑌𝑡 ] + 𝜃𝑡𝑀𝐶𝑗,𝑡 = 0 874 
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Equation Systems of First Order Conditions 875 
Taylor Rule Monetary Policy Mix Cap-and-Trade Climate Policy 876 
{  
   
   
  
   
   
   
 𝛽𝑅𝑡𝔼t [ 𝐶𝑡𝐶𝑡+1 1Πt+1 ] = 1(1 − 𝜃𝑡) − 𝛾(𝛱𝑡 − 1)𝛱𝑡 + 𝛽𝛾𝔼t [ 𝐶𝑡𝐶𝑡+1 (𝛱𝑡+1 − 1)𝛱𝑡+1 𝑌𝑡+1𝑌𝑡 ] + 𝜃𝑡𝑀𝐶𝑡 = 0𝑀𝐶𝑡 = 𝑊𝑡𝛬𝑡𝐴𝑡𝑃𝑡 + 𝜙1?̃?𝑡𝜙2 + 𝑝𝑍,𝑡(1 − 𝑈𝑡 − 𝑣𝑡)𝜑 + 𝜓2 𝑣𝑡2𝜑𝐿𝑡𝜂 = 𝑊𝑡𝜇𝐿𝑃𝑡𝐶𝑡𝑌𝑡 = 𝐶𝑡 + 𝜙1𝑈𝑡𝜙2𝑌𝑡 + 𝛾2 (𝛱𝑡 − 1)2𝑌𝑡𝑍 = (1 − 𝑈𝑡 − 𝑣𝑡)𝜑𝑌𝑡 + ?̃?𝑀𝑡 = (1 − 𝛿𝑀)𝑀𝑡−1 + (1 − 𝑈𝑡)𝜑𝑌𝑡 + ?̃?𝑌𝑡 = 𝛬𝑡𝐴𝑡𝐿𝑡𝑝𝑍,𝑡 = 1𝜑𝜙1𝜙2𝑈𝑡𝜙2−1𝑣𝑡 = 1𝜓𝜑𝜙1𝜙2𝑈𝑡𝜙2−1 = 𝑝𝑍,𝑡𝜓𝑅𝑡𝑅 = (𝛱𝑡𝛱)𝜌𝛱 ( 𝑌𝑡𝑌𝑡𝑛𝑎)𝜌𝑌
 877 
Taylor Rule Monetary Policy Mix Carbon Tax Climate Policy 878 
{  
    
    
    
    
  𝛽𝑅𝑡𝔼t [ 𝐶𝑡𝐶𝑡+1 1Πt+1 ] = 1(1 − 𝜃𝑡) − 𝛾(𝛱𝑡 − 1)𝛱𝑡 + 𝛽𝛾𝔼t [ 𝐶𝑡𝐶𝑡+1 (𝛱𝑡+1 − 1)𝛱𝑡+1 𝑌𝑡+1𝑌𝑡 ] + 𝜃𝑡𝑀𝐶𝑡 = 0𝑀𝐶𝑡 = 𝑊𝑡𝛬𝑡𝐴𝑡𝑃𝑡 + 𝜙1𝑈𝜙2 + 𝑝𝑍(1 − 𝑈 − 𝑣)𝜑 + 𝜓2 𝑣2𝜑𝐿𝑡𝜂 = 𝑊𝑡𝜇𝐿𝑃𝑡𝐶𝑡𝑌𝑡 = 𝐶𝑡 + 𝜙1𝑈𝜙2𝑌𝑡 + 𝛾2 (𝛱𝑡 − 1)2𝑌𝑡𝑀𝑡 = (1 − 𝛿𝑀)𝑀𝑡−1 + (1 − 𝑈)𝜑𝑌𝑡 + ?̃?𝑌𝑡 = 𝛬𝑡𝐴𝑡𝐿𝑡𝑝𝑍 = 1𝜑𝜙1𝜙2𝑈𝜙2−1𝑣 = 1𝜓𝜑𝜙1𝜙2𝑈𝜙2−1 = 𝑝𝑍𝜓𝑅𝑡𝑅 = (𝛱𝑡𝛱)𝜌𝛱 ( 𝑌𝑡𝑌𝑡𝑛𝑎)𝜌𝑌
 879 
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Taylor Rule Monetary Policy Mix No Control Climate Policy 880 
No control policy is a special case of the carbon tax policy with 𝑝𝑍 = 0 . The 881 
equation system is all the same as with the “Taylor Rule Monetary Policy Mix Carbon 882 
Tax Climate Policy” except that 𝑝𝑍 is set as 0. 883 
Taylor Rule Monetary Policy Mix Ramsey Optimal Climate Policy 884 
𝔼𝑡∑𝛽𝑡 (ln𝐶𝑡 − 𝜇𝐿 𝐿𝑡1+𝜂1 + 𝜂)∞𝑡=0
𝑠. 𝑡.
{  
   
  
   
   
 𝛽𝑅𝑡𝔼t [ 𝐶𝑡𝐶𝑡+1 1Πt+1 ] = 1(1 − 𝜃𝑡) − 𝛾(𝛱𝑡 − 1)𝛱𝑡 + 𝛽𝛾𝔼t [ 𝐶𝑡𝐶𝑡+1 (𝛱𝑡+1 − 1)𝛱𝑡+1 𝑌𝑡+1𝑌𝑡 ] + 𝜃𝑡𝑀𝐶𝑡 = 0𝑀𝐶𝑡 = 𝑊𝑡𝛬𝑡𝐴𝑡𝑃𝑡 + 𝜙1𝑈𝑡𝜙2 + 𝑝𝑍,𝑡(1 − 𝑈𝑡 − 𝑣𝑡)𝜑 + 𝜓2 𝑣𝑡2𝜑𝐿𝑡𝜂 = 𝑊𝑡𝜇𝐿𝑃𝑡𝐶𝑡𝑌𝑡 = 𝐶𝑡 + 𝜙1𝑈𝑡𝜙2𝑌𝑡 + 𝛾2 (𝛱𝑡 − 1)2𝑌𝑡𝑀𝑡 = (1 − 𝛿𝑀)𝑀𝑡−1 + (1 − 𝑈𝑡)𝜑𝑌𝑡 + ?̃?𝑌𝑡 = 𝛬𝑡𝐴𝑡𝐿𝑡𝑅𝑡𝑅 = (𝛱𝑡𝛱)𝜌𝛱 ( 𝑌𝑡𝑌𝑡𝑛𝑎)𝜌𝑌
 885 
 886 
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